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Large‐scale hydroelectric dams have—throughout their history—had adverse impacts
on local population groups, natural resources, and entire eco‐systems furthering resis-
tance and protest against them.
In this paper, we aim to investigate the impact of social mobilization against large‐
scale dams by considering political opportunity structures, actor constellations, and
frames. We comparatively analyze three case studies in varying political systems,
that is, Gibe III in Ethiopia, Belo Monte in Brazil, and Barro Blanco in Panama. Our
investigation is based on field research in these countries comprising data collection
of governmental reports, newspaper articles, materials published by civil society orga-
nizations, and semi‐structured interviews. The analysis reveals that the impact of
mobilization against dams is certainly limited in contexts with authoritarian govern-
ments. In democratic contexts, the impact depends on the degree of external involve-
ment, as well as the ability of movements to avoid fracture, especially in view of
temporal dimensions of large infrastructure projects.
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Barro Blanco1 | INTRODUCTION
Despite promises to increase energy access and foster low‐carbon
economic growth, large‐scale hydroelectric dam projects have con-
tinuously had severe impacts on local population groups, natural
resources, and entire eco‐systems. This has furthered resistance, pro-
test, and social mobilization against dams. In this article, we examine
how social mobilization can have an impact on dam‐building. We
understand impact as a change in the way dam projects are planned
or implemented.
The objective of this paper is to inductively investigate this ques-
tion by comparatively analyzing three case studies, Gibe III in Ethiopia,
Belo Monte in Brazil, and Barro Blanco in Panama. We have selected
these cases because they have important commonalities and are
typical cases representing governmental visions of green growth.
However, this case selection also displays an important variety ofileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/sdcontextual factors, political conditions, and degrees of social mobiliza-
tion. Ethiopia has an authoritarian government that severely represses
its civil society; in this case, social mobilization was particularly low. In
Brazil, protests against Belo Monte were initially successful in the
1980s but then failed to effectively stop the dam, not least because
it was a democratically elected and economically successful govern-
ment pushing the project. In Panama, social mobilization in a demo-
cratic environment was so strong that it led to a suspension of dam
construction. Although the dam project later became fully operational,
a positive impact of social mobilization was the renegotiation of con-
ditions for affected indigenous peoples.
Our analysis is based on field research in all of these countries
comprising data collection of governmental reports, newspaper arti-
cles, materials published by civil society organizations (CSOs), field
observation, and semi‐structured interviews (Whyte, 1984; Witzel,
2000). We have evaluated this primary data using a qualitative© 2019 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment 1
2 SCHAPPER ET AL.content analysis (Mayring, 2015). In our analysis, we apply a compara-
tive case study approach carving out commonalities and differences
between the cases (George & Bennet, 2005). Although cross‐country
comparison between mobilizations concerning certain issues is now
established in the sociology of social movements (Mertig & Dunlop,
2001), a specific comparison of mobilizations against dam‐building
has not yet been undertaken. Against this background, the nature of
this paper is exploratory rather than explanative.
Our goal is to pave the way for more in‐depth research on the
impacts of anti‐dam mobilization in regions where the burdens of
the global struggle against climate change is loaded onto those who
have contributed the least to global warming. In the following, we will
first review the literature on social mobilization against dams and
present our analytical framework. We will then introduce the three
case studies and comparatively analyze them before we conclude.2 | SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AGAINST DAMS
—AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Donors, development banks, and governmental actors have con-
tinuously presented large‐scale dam projects as policies for sustain-
able development, modernity, and progress (Baird, Shoemaker, &
Manorom, 2015). Governments hope to close the gap of a lacking
energy infrastructure but also see a window of opportunity in re-
ceiving donor funds for green energy transition (Pan & Zhu, 2006;
Urban, 2015).
Critical scholars emphasize that large hydroelectric dams represent
a vision of neoliberal, capitalist development at the expense of margin-
alized communities (Sugden & Punch, 2014). Thus, dams can reveal
ideological challenges to the dominant understanding of development
(Gadgil & Guha, 1994). Many countries with dam projects have
resettled and marginalized social groups, such as pastoralists and
indigenous peoples (Dwivedi, 1999; Heggelund, 2006; Morvaridi,
2004). Their governments use such strategies as ways of “nation‐
building” (Gadgil & Guha, 1994, p. 110). Communities' ability to func-
tion on their ancestral lands, to use water sites, land, and forests for
sustaining their livelihoods, are taken away through resettlement,
denying access to rivers, or flooding habitation areas (Morvaridi,
2004; Schlosberg & Carruthers, 2010; Urban, 2015). Grassroots pro-
test groups, social movements, and transnational advocacy networks
(TANs) have tried to raise local concerns about the environment,
human rights, and indigenous peoples (Grieco, 2016; Nordensvard,
Urban, & Mang, 2015). Displacement in relation to dams or other
development projects is one of the main concerns leading
to mobilization and protest (Swain, 2016), often initiated at the grass-
roots level (Oliver‐Smith, 2010). Protest mobilization has been partic-
ularly successful if a transnational alliance of advocacy actors was able
to link up with domestic allies in democratic contexts (Khagram, 2004).
Our comparison of the three cases is guided by a variety of con-
cepts concerning the structures, dynamics, and ideas of social move-
ments, which we regard as complementary (McAdam, McCarthy, &
Mayer, 1996). First, we will focus on the frames used by differentactors in relation to dam construction. Although we have used refer-
ence to green growth to select our cases, we aim at developing a
deeper understanding of this frame by comparatively investigating
its use. We will also explore counter‐frames employed by those social
actors opposing dam projects in more depth. We understand frames
according to Goffman (1974) as cognitive structures regulating the
perception, reflection, and reinterpretation of reality. Their function
is to guide individual or collective action (Snow, Rochford, Worden,
& Benford, 1986, p. 464). The selection and construction of cognitive
frames belong to the most important strategies of actors in social
movements (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 18). Frame construction is suc-
cessful if it resonates among the target group or the wider public. In
the course of our empirical analysis, we will also pay attention to con-
trasting frames, frame alignment, and other aspects of meaning‐
making (Snow et al., 1986). Previous studies have shown that issue‐
framing can be an important success factor for social mobilization
against dam projects (Kirchherr 2017). A second relevant set of con-
cepts we refer to are the respective political opportunity structures
(POS) as well as the wider political context of mobilization (Eisinger,
1973; Kriesi, 2004; Meyer, 2004). Tarrow (1998, pp. 19–20) defines
POS as “consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimen-
sions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in con-
tentious politics”. We will adopt this conceptualization and pay
attention to identifying relevant variables of political struggle in the
case analysis (Meyer, 2004). Meyer and Minkoff (2004) emphasize
that political openness is one core element of POS. Tilly (1978) reveals
that there is a curvilinear relationship between openness of the polit-
ical system and political protest. Direct access to influence in a system
makes protest unnecessary, whereas too many restrictions repress
protesters and hamper important capacity development processes.
Joachim (2003) suggests a distinction between POS and mobilization
structures in order to evaluate how successful frames resonate within
a transnational campaign. Differentiating between context and action
is critical to understanding the relationship between structure and
agency (Meyer, 2004). Whereas POS can be understood as access to
(state) institutions and the broader institutional context that can pro-
vide opportunities or obstacles for frame resonance (Tarrow, 1998),
mobilization structures refer to successful network‐building (Joachim,
2003). The concept of POS resonates well with recent studies that
emphasize the role of the state and the political regime in green
energy transition (Lederer, Wallbott, & Steffen, 2018; Urban et al.,
2015). Scholars accentuate that channels for political contestation
with respect to energy decisions are more open in democratic sys-
tems, whereas restrictive political regimes tend to initiate repressive
responses (Simpson & Smits, 2018).
Mobilization structures or actor constellations include norm entre-
preneurs and their organizational platforms, reaching out to a hetero-
geneous international constituency, and the inclusion of experts, very
often affected individuals themselves who can share their experiences
as testimonies (Joachim, 2003). Many constructivist studies highlight
the role of non‐state actors and TANs in processes of norm evolution
and change (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The use of information plays a
critical role in transnational alliance‐building. When communication
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ernment are blocked, the opposition can link with TANs providing
them with information about the repressive situation within the
country. TANs can then exert pressure on the respective government
and demand a change. If transnational pressure from above and local
pressure from below is exerted at the same time, the government
may start to make tactical concessions or even engage in a dialogue
about norm change (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). Transnational
alliance‐building and cross‐border activism can successfully lead to
improved hydropower development, strengthening environmental
and social standards (Simpson, 2013). However, the leverage of TANs
also depends on the targeted states and their domestic capacities
(Bratman, 2014; Hochstetler, 2002). An additional central aspect in
our analysis will be the shifting relations between different social
movement actors and their respective environments in various arenas
of mobilization, ranging from the local to the transnational. In this con-
text, we will emphasize that such relations change over time and in
response to the respective impact of the mobilization—or lack thereof
(Rucht, 2004). Therefore, we will also take the temporal dimension of
large infrastructure projects into consideration.
In our paper, we aim at gaining a better understanding of frames,
POS, and actor constellations in different contexts. This will help us
identify barriers and facilitators of the impact of social mobilization
against dams. Although we recognize that the outcomes and conse-
quences of social movements can be interpreted in many different
ways (Giugni, 1998), we focus especially on influence in dam planning
and implementation.3 | CASE STUDIES
3.1 | Ethiopia
The Ethiopian government has initiated an ambitious “Climate‐
Resilient Green Economy” (CRGE) strategy in 2011 (GoE, 2011aa)
and aims at becoming the African leader in low‐carbon economic
growth and a middle‐income country by 2025 (GoE, 2011aa). Hydro-
power generation is a key priority in the CRGE. In the Ethiopian Her-
ald, Wubete calls the Gibe III dam a “milestone for building Ethiopia's
green economy” (Wubete, 2017).
Gibe III delivers electricity to more than 80 million people and even
to regions that previously did not have access to electricity at all
(HRW[Human Rights Watch], 2012). The dam is located about 300
km southwest of Addis Ababa, at the Omo River. Its construction
began in 2006, but it did not become fully operational until the end
of 2016, producing 1,870 MW of electricity. The dam more than
doubles Ethiopia's current capacity so that the country will be able
to sell energy to Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti. Project development
and oversight are in the hands of the Ethiopian Electric Power Corpo-
ration. Salini Impregilo, an Italian construction company, built the dam.
The largest part of the funding is covered by the Chinese Export–
Import Bank (EXIM), whereas the Ethiopian government contributes
572 million USD of its national budget to finance the project. TheWorld Bank (WB) had been involved in planning hydroelectric power
projects in Ethiopia since the 1980s. After carrying out preliminary
evaluation studies, the WB, the European Investment Bank (EIB),
and the African Development Bank (AfDB) announced in 2010 that
they were no longer considering funding Gibe III due to serious doubts
relating to adverse social and environmental impacts (International
Rivers, 2011).
In 2009, before the Green Economy strategywas adopted but when
dam‐building was already in progress, the authoritarian Ethiopian
government passed the Charities and Societies Proclamation, which
came into force in 2010. This law heavily restricts and controls the
activities and publications of CSOs in the country, in particular with
respect to human rights and minority issues. Moreover, Ethiopia ranks
fourth among the most censured countries according to the Committee
to Protect Journalists (CPT, 2015), imposing severe restrictions on the
press and the media, and arresting journalists, opposition groups, and
researchers who raise critical questions.
When violent resettlements of indigenous peoples living along the
Omo River were carried out by the police and the military, there were
hardly any functioning CSOs in the country that could effectively
protest, report on rights infringements, or deliver information to inter-
national allies. Indigenous communities—including the Mursi, Bodi,
Kwegu, Karo, Hamer, Suri, Nyangatom, and Daasanach—had not been
informed or consulted regarding the dam project. They all depend on
the river for agricultural purposes and for feeding cattle on flooded
grazing lands (HRW , 2012, p. 1–2) as they have traditionally lived as
agro‐pastoralists or pastoralists or reverted to fishing as an additional
source of livelihood (Carr, 2012, p. 57).
3.1.1 | Political opportunity structures
Ethiopia has a restrictive authoritarian government, which is consid-
ered as “not free” according to the Freedom House Index with the
worst scores for political liberties, that is 7 out of 7 (7 means least
free) and civil liberties, that is, 6 out of 7 (7 means least free; FHI,
2017). The 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation strictly limits
the advocacy work of CSOs trying to lobby the government to
improve the situation of pastoralists and indigenous communities
affected by the dam. In October 2016, the Ethiopian government
declared a state of emergency, limiting even more rights and free-
doms, to regain governmental control over oppositional protests of
ethnic groups as a reaction to rigorous development programs. The
last state of emergency was declared in February 2018 after Prime
Minister Hailemariam Desalegn resigned from office (BBC, 2018).
3.1.2 | Actor constellations
Due to the constraints in the POS and hampered outreach to interna-
tional allies, there was hardly any social mobilization against Gibe III in
Ethiopia. The government built a strong alliance with the private
investor EXIM and the construction company, Salini Impregilo. One
of the interviewed NGOs described the dam implementation process
with the following words:
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sent?—No. Did they get at least an amount of compensation?—No.
[…] I always say it's like Wall Street coming into the villages […]. They
just care about their profits.”1
The local people did not have a voice in the dam‐building process.
Only a few of them protested when they were threatened with violent
relocation, but the military and the police arrested and killed these
people (HRW , 2012). The demands of locally affected pastoralists
and indigenous communities could hardly be taken up by CSOs in
the country due to the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation.
After it entered into force, CSOs were not allowed to work on indige-
nous or human rights advocacy anymore and if they did, their registra-
tion was cancelled by the government:
“Human rights‐related issues are, you know, we are not allowed
now to engage in such issues. […] We don't have really the mandate
and the power to talk about this and bring this to the table for the
government to engage in advocacy and the like.”2
Therefore, CSOs mainly focused on providing social services and
support at the grassroots level, but did not manage to engage in trans-
national alliance‐building or delivering information to international
advocacy partners.3.1.3 | Dominant frames
Ethiopia's government was advised by the consultancy firm McKinsey
& Co. to pursue a green development strategy with one focus being
investment in hydroelectricity. The CRGE was formulated by the for-
mer Environmental Protection Authority under leadership of then
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who ruled the country between 1995
and 2012. The CRGE vision entails that Ethiopia becomes African
leader in low‐carbon growth (GoE, 2011b) following a vision of neolib-
eral development. The main frame used in governmental policy docu-
ments and expert interviews at the Ministry of Water and Energy is
transformation to a green economy. Realizing economic development
goals, however, has always been at the forefront and a rigorous imple-
mentation strategy has been employed. Green economy is simply a
frame used to align donors' funding priorities—that is, climate change
mitigation and adaptation—with the government's priorities—that is,
economic growth: “So they are asking the West to support their green
economy. […] That's helping them to gain more money, which they
might use for their own political agendas.”3 Even international NGOs
confirm that this rhetoric frame alignment is a “politically extremely
smart move in the game”4 in the name of economic growth.
Affected people, mainly indigenous communities, who protested
against relocations and severe interference into their traditional liveli-
hoods, were depicted by the government as “very communal, very
primitive.”5 In an interview, an expert of the governmental research1Interview Ethiopian NGO_1
2Interview Ethiopian NGO_2
3Interview Ethiopian NGO_1
4Interview International NGO
5Interview Ministry of Water and Energyinstitute that was one of the key players in drafting the CRGE even
stated: “People never accept new things. […]. They are very back-
ward.”6 This shows that if you opposed this development strategy,
you were portrayed as being backward. The government very much
emphasized how it wanted pastoralists to become agriculturalists
and successfully integrated this plan into the resettlement strategy.
CSOs further emphasize that behind these assumptions is a vision of
development as modernization: “So if you are talking about […] the
rights of these people, then you will be challenging the ways, the ideas
that you are against the development, the modernization of these
communities.”7 This means a second important frame or a contrasting
pair of frames used is modernization versus backwardness.3.2 | Brazil
Plans for a huge hydroelectric dam on the Xingu River started in the
1970s as part of the military regime's attempt at exploring the Amazon
region for development purposes. However, local actors succeeded in
mobilizing against the project and building up strong transnational net-
works (Bratman, 2014, p. 272). As a result, external funders including
the WB withdrew their support and the project was effectively
shelved (Hall & Branford, 2012, p. 852). Around the turn of the millen-
nium, the plan was put back on the agenda (Fearnside, 2017, p. 19).
The governments of the progressive Workers' Party under presidents
Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff pushed the project forward in spite
of local and transnational activism, whereas the movement against
the dam was weakened due to friction (Klein, 2015, p. 1145). As a
consequence, a justicialization of the opposition took place (Moraes
Corrêa & Verás de Oliveira, 2015, p. 31). A series of court rulings tem-
porarily halted the project several times but were routinely reversed
by higher courts (Fearnside, 2017, p. 18). A supranational layer was
added to the judicial opposition against the dam when the case was
taken to the Inter‐American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
in 2011. The commission ordered the immediate stop of the project
until the legal requirements had been met. However, Brazil responded
by rejecting the ruling, suspending its payments, and pursuing the pro-
ject nonetheless. Full operation of the dam is foreseen for 2020.3.2.1 | Political opportunity structures
Since the late 1980s, mobilizations against the dam have taken place
in a context of democratic transition and consolidation. Information
flows are free and TANs could be built. The project that was approved
by Congress in 2004 contained thorough modifications of the original
plan drafted by the military rulers, a fact that has been interpreted as a
sign of considerable responsiveness of the Brazilian democracy (Bur-
rier, 2016, p. 347). The 2009 World Social Forum in Belém presented
an important opportunity to raise worldwide awareness for the threat
presented by Belo Monte.6Interview Governmental Research Institute
7Interview Ethiopian NGO_2
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hampered by Brazilian economic autonomy: as opposed to the
situation in the 1980s, the government could later realize the project
without depending on external funding. This made it harder for
activists to leverage the TANs because pressuring funding agencies,
such as the WB or others, would not prevent the project (Bratman,
2014, p. 285). Brazil's strong political and financial position as an
important regional player helped in its blunt rebuttal of the ruling by
the IACHR, which demonstrated the limitations of the inter‐American
system of supranational law (Riethof, 2017, p. 493). Although Brazil is
a functioning democracy with a vibrant civil society sector, activists
are often threatened with violence. Furthermore, their criminalization
is bound to intensify under the new president Jair Bolsonaro.83.2.2 | Actor constellations
In the process through which the dam on the Xingu River was put back
on the agenda, the Brazilian electricity agency Eletrobrás played a cen-
tral role. It is part of an influential constellation of pro‐dam actors,
which also includes the construction companies and industries pro-
ducing electro‐intensive commodities as well as mining companies
(Hall & Branford, 2012, p. 852).
Surprisingly, the Workers' Party—especially Dilma Rousseff, as
Minister of Mines and Energy and later as president of Brazil—pushed
the project. Although corruption played a role in the party's support
for the dam (Fearnside, 2017, p. 17), the project is also in line with
its general neo‐developmentalist vision of state capitalism (Hall &
Branford, 2012, p. 855). Despite public funding, the government
deliberately refrains from dominating the construction consortium
Norte Energia. Thus, the project is “government‐driven” but not
“government‐run” (Klein, 2015, p. 1139), which illustrates a typical
parallelism of neo‐developmentalist and neoliberal policies (Saad‐Filho
& Morais, 2012).
At the beginning, the most important opposition movement
against the dam was the Movimento Pelo Desenvolvimento da
Transamazônica e Xingu (MDTX). However, the pro‐dam stance of
the Workers' Party with which the movement had strong ideational
and material ties, caused a deep conflict of loyalty, illustrating a
pattern of former movement allies turning into competitors and
adversaries (Rucht, 2004, p. 209). Against this background, the MDTX
and other organizations settled for an uneasy neutrality towards the
dam and participated in negotiations over mitigation efforts, defending
their position as based on an ethic of responsibility (Klein, 2015, p.
1147). When the actual implementation of the project began in
2010, a rupture with the intransigent section of the movement
emerged, which was led by the Movimento Xingu Vivo Para Sempre.
Its principled opposition was supported by the Catholic Church, espe-
cially the local Bishop Dom Erwin Kräutler. Among the CSOs engaged
in the struggle for resettlement and compensation for the affected
populations, the Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens (Movement8Interview member of Xingo Vivo Para Sempre based in Belém.of People affected by Dams) has acquired a more prominent role in
recent years.
Indigenous leaders have also been at the forefront of the struggle
against Belo Monte. However, in recent years the pro‐dam side has
succeeded in convincing many indigenous leaders to abandon their
opposition in exchange for material rewards, which has led to severe
friction within communities (Fearnside, 2017, p. 19).
Given the justicialization of the conflict, legal actors also play a
major role in the fight against the dam. This is especially true for the
Ministério Publico, a special prosecutor in defense of the interests of
the people. The branch in the state of Pará was the main driving force
of a series of important—if temporary—legal victories against the dam.3.2.3 | Dominant frames
One of the dominant frames recurred to in defense of the dam project
is the claim that it provides clean energy and thereby contributes to
the global goal of fighting climate change (Moraes Corrêa & Verás
de Oliveira, 2015, p. 34). Belo Monte, as a model for clean energy gen-
eration, was the key message of the government's advertising cam-
paign during the Rio + 20 summit in 2012, when it presented itself
as a leader in the fight against climate change (Bratman, 2015, p.
72). In opposing this framing, anti‐dam activists also emphasized the
importance of preserving the planet, highlighting that the Amazon rain
forest, which is threatened by the dam, is part of the “fundamental
natural heritage for all Brazilians and all citizens of the world” (MDTX,
2001).
Besides its emphasis on clean energy, the government's priority is
clearly economic growth, as is expressed in the name of its flagship
program, the Plan for the Acceleration of Growth. In documents justify-
ing Belo Monte, development is the most common frame. In the
government's response to the IACHR ruling, it emphasized that elec-
tricity was fundamental for “Brazil's development goals,” including
the goals to “promote human dignity, eradicate extreme poverty, and
reduce inequalities” (Riethof, 2017, p. 491). Such claims are explicitly
rejected by anti‐dam activists: “[W]e feel affronted in our dignity and
disrespected in our fundamental rights by the Brazilian state and pri-
vate groups through the construction of dams on the Xingu […]”
(Encontro Xingu Vivo para Sempre, 2008). Some of the activists
emphasize the extreme inequality in the distribution of the benefits
of the project: “The dam produces riches for a few, but at the same
time it puts people into a state of absolute misery.”9 Others reject
the underlying developmentalist vision altogether: “We are against
this model of exploitation, reprimarization and exportation. […]
Each people has its own way to relate to nature and we need to
respect this.”10
Another decisive frame is democracy: For example, in 2010, Lula
stated that the realization of the dam was a “democratic act” (Lula
da Silva, 2010). In direct reaction to this speech, anti‐dam activists
recalled that in Altamira, the city close to the dam, this alleged act of9Interview coordinator of MAB based in Altamira.
10Interview member of Xingu Vivo Para Sempre based in Belém.
11Interview Osvaldo Jordan, ACD
6 SCHAPPER ET AL.democracy was always accompanied by a strong presence of police
and military, drawing a parallel between Lula's visit to the Amazon
and that of military dictator Médici in the 1970s (Salm, 2010).
3.3 | Panama
There has been social mobilization against dam‐building on the
Tabasará River in Panama since the 1970s, when the government first
embarked on a drive to exploit water flows for energy (Campbell,
2014; Rubio & Tafunell, 2014). Following two failed proposals, the
Barro Blanco project was the third dam to result in organized protest.
The dam will flood land in the comarca Ngäbe‐Buglé, an autonomous
territory created in 1997 for the exclusive use of the local indigenous
population.
The concessions to construct Barro Blanco were granted to devel-
oper Generadora del Istmo, S. A. (GENISA) in 2007 (Hofbauer &
Mayrhofer, 2016). It was first proposed as a 19 MW structure; how-
ever, it was later increased to 28.84 MW. Despite making a consider-
able difference to the maximum flood level, only one Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) was conducted, using the specifications
of the smaller dam (Jordan, 2008). Funding was secured from two
European state‐owned development banks, the Netherlands Develop-
ment Finance Company (FMO) and the German Investment Corpora-
tion (DEG), alongside the Central American Bank for Economic
Integration (CABEI). Following a consultation period, the dam was reg-
istered as a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project in 2011.
When construction began in 2011, access to the site was restricted
by Ngäbe protesters (Sogandares, 2011). This set in motion a protest
movement that would last over 7 years, with tactics ranging from direct
action on the ground to petitioning German and Dutch embassies
(Watts, Brannum, & Ruff, 2014). Following sustained pressure and
social mobilization in the form of marches, preventing access to the site,
and blockading the Pan‐American Highway, the Ngäbe gained interna-
tional attention and support (Watts et al., 2014). This resulted in James
Anaya, the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, visiting to
investigate the situation in 2014 (UN Special Rapporteur, 2014).
He ruled that the dam should only have been constructed following
the prior agreement of the indigenous communities (Anaya, 2014).
His decision influenced the Panamanian National Environmental
Authority's ruling to suspend the dam due to an improper EIA in
2015, a direct result of the social mobilization that encouraged his visit.
However, this suspension was later overturned by the Panama
Supreme Court (Hofbauer & Mayrhofer, 2016, p. 19). Thereafter, the
movement continued and following international scrutiny, the project
was de‐registered from the CDM in 2016. Despite this, the dam has
reached completion, forcibly evicting the affected communities.
3.3.1 | Political opportunity structures
The democratic political system of Panama enabled the movement to
challenge the dam in the judicial sphere (AIDA, 2012). This was despite
several amendments to domestic environmental law that removed
the need for participation from indigenous communities (Runk, 2012:p.28). Further, the government engaged in a number of dialogues over
a sustained period with the movement, these took place with three
separately elected governing parties—Osvaldo Jordan of the Panama-
nian NGO Alianza para la Conservación y el Desarrollo (ACD) noted
that this demonstrated a “political consensus against indigenous peo-
ple at the highest level.”11
The dam was funded by Western financing agencies (Hofbauer &
Mayrhofer, 2016). The promise of funding made challenging the dam
through the IACHR within the time constraints of its construction
almost impossible. The movement was free to form transnational
alliances and discuss the dam with media sources. This resulted in an
international campaign that attempted to force compliance with inter-
nationally accepted human rights standards.3.3.2 | Actor constellations
Within the opposition, there were several indigenous resistance groups
with various leaders but the Movimiento 10 de Abril (M‐10) was the
most important actor. They had experience in defeating previous dams
and their leader, Manolo Miranda, lived within the floodplain alongside
his family. He was determined to fight by any means, and the tactics of
the M‐10 often conflicted with the diplomatic efforts of the Ngäbe
General Cacica Silvia Carrera (Kennedy, 2016).
Cacica Carrera was crucial in representing the community at the
negotiating table and following the M‐10's successful blockade of
the construction site, she was invited to engage in talks with the gov-
ernment in 2011 culminating in the San Felix Agreement (DEG, 2015).
This accord contained a government promise to prohibit mining within
the comarca. However, ongoing projects were to continue, including
Barro Blanco (DEG, 2015). This agreement was unacceptable to the
M‐10, who escalated their tactics by blocking the Pan‐American High-
way in 2012. In response, the Panamanian government authorized the
use of teargas and birdshot; resulting in allegations of police brutality
and the death of one indigenous protester (Watts et al., 2014). These
violent and well‐publicized events pressured the government into fur-
ther negotiations with the Cacica, mediated by the Catholic Church
(DEG, 2015). This resulted in changes to Law 11 of the mining code
that would prohibit mining within the comarca and stipulated that
all future projects were subject to the approval of Ngäbe‐Buglé
regional congresses (Cortez, 2012; DEG, 2015). The combination of
the Cacica's willingness to negotiate and the M‐10's direct action
and resistance resulted in significant amendments to national law that
would protect the comarca in the future. This is a notable achieve-
ment; however, the M‐10 refused to accept the continuation of Barro
Blanco. Thereafter, the movement was divided, with some accepting
the concessions made by Carrera and others siding with the M‐10
(Cansari & Gausset, 2013).
The M‐10 had support throughout the comarca, particularly by
adherents of the Mama Tata religion. Osvaldo Jordan explained:
“Flooding the sacred Kiad site was going against the Mama Tata, it's
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support from other believers.”12
Theywere also effective in network‐building outside the indigenous
community, gaining support from TANs, including AIDA and Interna-
tional Rivers. These organizations linked up with domestic CSOs, such
as the ACD and the Centro de Incidencia Ambiental. They were crucial
in supporting judicial efforts, whereas international CSOs, such as
Both Ends, raised a complaint against the financiers. The movement
also allied with social and environmental organizations who were
campaigning for an end to mining and to protect water flows worldwide
(Rivera, 2016).
On the side supporting the dam, the financiers FMO, DEG, and
CABEI were the dominant force pushing the project onwards. They
had committed funding and refused to consider cancelling. They
worked with GENISA to argue that the dam was beneficial to the
affected communities (Hofbauer & Mayrhofer, 2016). Further, they
formed a close alliance and were difficult to challenge, particularly as
they had the support of the government.
3.3.3 | Dominant frames
One of the key frames used by the proponents of Barro Blanco is that
dams provide vital clean energy for Panama's growing demands (Gor-
don, 2010). They have become a symbol of green development in Pan-
ama, both tackling climate change and increasing electricity
production, as well as creating investment opportunities and economic
growth (Campbell, 2014). Panama was one of the first states to ratify
the Paris Agreement (2015) and this commitment to a sustainable
future played a key role in governmental decisions.
Despite the government's commitment to green energy, the crucial
factor in their support for hydropower projects is economic growth
and investment. They frame Barro Blanco as an opportunity that is
integral to the modernization of the indigenous communities who
have been broadly portrayed as “backwards” (Mayhew et al., 2010,
p. 9). Therefore, dams are framed as essential in their progression
towards a modern way of life.
Opponents to the project frame the protest movement as an
attempt to preserve Panama's traditions. They have often pointed out
that the Ngäbe were in Panama before the arrival of the Spanish
(Rosario, 2011). This argument can be aligned with carbon colonialism,
where foreign investment results in the destruction of indigenous
territories (Newell & Paterson, 2010). However, the indigenous op-
position were predominantly concerned with the preservation of
their traditional life; they were fighting to protect their homes, religion,
and heritage.4 | COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND
DISCUSSION
There are a few commonalities that can be observed in all three cases.
The vision behind these large‐scale projects is to foster neoliberal12Interview, Osvaldo Jordan, ACDdevelopment with a focus on economic growth. More precisely, we
find two major frames used in relation to dams. The first is clean energy
and development, green economy or green growth. Here, state actors
align their discourse with the global goal of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, whereas at the same time, fostering economic growth as
a national priority. “Green” is synonymously used as low‐carbon,
whereas all dam endeavors had serious environmental implications
and led to the disruption of delicate ecosystems. In all of our cases,
development is understood as modernization, a second dominant
frame often used to justify adverse effects on indigenous communities
and the destruction of their traditional livelihoods. Dam opposing
movements have introduced counter‐frames, including inequality
and injustice, often relating to the unfair distribution of material ben-
efits but also to lacking procedural justice mechanisms, including
access to information, transparency, participation in decision‐making,
and remedies.
A number of key differences between Gibe III, Belo Monte, and
Barro Blanco can be observed in the POS. Due to the restrictive
political environment in Ethiopia, any activism or mobilization against
Gibe III was blocked (FHI, 2017). This was not the case in either Brazil
or Panama.
Another interesting difference with regard to POS concerns the
involvement of international donors. In both Brazil and Ethiopia, the
WB was involved in the beginning but later withdrew its support in
view of anticipated adverse effects of the dam project. Although Brazil
ultimately managed to finance the project mostly on its own, Ethiopia
sought support from Chinese investors. Barro Blanco in Panama was
the only example of involvement of Western financing agencies,
including the Dutch FMO and the German DEG, alongside the Central
American Bank for Economic Integration—and this had an impact on
social mobilization, in particular the renegotiation of conditions for
affected population groups.
In Brazil and Panama, a considerable share of mobilization was car-
ried out in the judicial sphere and in lawsuits, which were temporarily
successful in stopping dam construction. Both countries are also
embedded in a system of supranational courts. However, the results
were surprisingly unsuccessful: Brazil simply rejected the ruling,
whereas Panama's Supreme Court ruled in favor of a continuation of
dam construction before a decision by the IACHR was made.
Actor constellations reveal more differences between the three
cases. In the Ethiopian case, we can see how local CSOs offer ser-
vices to the affected population but there is no transnational
alliance‐building. In Panama, we could observe a highly institutional-
ized domestic social movement that reached out to international CSOs
and built strong transnational alliances. The movement opposing
Belo Monte in Brazil was well institutionalized at times but later
became fragmented. Transnational alliance‐building in this case was
also strong but could not be upheld. We have also observed heteroge-
neity within indigenous groups, mainly in the Brazilian case, regarding
goal prioritization.
Table 1 summarizes the case comparison.
In all three cases, social mobilization could not stop the dams
from being built but had a varying impact on dam‐building. When
TABLE 1 Comparative analysis of Gibe III, Belo Monte, and Barro Blanco
Gibe III Belo Monte Barro Blanco
Commonalities
Development Vision Neoliberal development with a focus on economic growth Brazil: neo‐developmentalism in parallel with neoliberalism
Dominant Frames Green growth, modernization, and progress
Counter‐Frames Inequality and injustice
Affected Population Groups Indigenous peoples (Brazil: non‐indigenous peasants)
Differences
Political System Not free Free Free
Dam‐Funding Government and private
investments
Government and state‐owned
bank
Government and international/regional
development banks
Institutionalization of Social
Movement
No Yes, but later fragmented Yes
Alliance Building No Yes Yes
Judicial Activism No Yes Yes
Impact of social mobilization None Low (temporary suspensions) Re‐negotiation of conditions
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be considered.
For Ethiopia, we can observe that the authoritarian regime simply
did not allow for any political mobilization against the dam project in
order to raise awareness of the negative impacts or build transnational
alliances.
Although this adverse POS can go a long way to explain the fail-
ures of social movement mobilization in Ethiopia, it will not suffice
for Panama and Brazil. In both Latin American cases, social mobiliza-
tion was not repressed by the state, and transnational activism was
possible. Here, findings concerning the actor constellations and the
framing practices become relevant: One decisive factor, which weak-
ened the mobilization and affected its impact on politics in both
Panama and Brazil, was friction within the movements. Although in
the Brazilian case, this was also due to bonds of loyalty between
the ruling Workers' Party and several social movement organizations,
the commonality between the two cases is linked to the time dimen-
sion of contentious politics around infrastructure projects; when the
objects of contention are hydroelectric dams, there is a critical point
at which the physical conditions of a place are altered so thoroughly
that it becomes impossible to reconstruct the status quo ante. In
Brazil and Panama, when the point of no return was reached, friction
within the movements increased, namely between those who upheld
principled opposition and those who argued in favor of negotiating
compensations.
In spite of these similarities, there remains a striking difference
between the two. The social movements against the dam in Panama
did reach some meaningful alterations of conditions, which was not
the case in Brazil. Here, the involvement of external Western donors
in Panama as opposed to the financial autonomy in Brazil plays an
important role; because such actors are nominally committed to
international norms on dam‐building and potentially vulnerable to
public naming and shaming, they tend to be more susceptible to
transnational mobilization than other actors.5 | CONCLUSION
Our comparative analysis of three cases has revealed that several
factors can hamper the impact of such mobilizations; apart from the
restrictions imposed by an authoritarian regime such as the Ethiopian
one, other factors are highly relevant.
One of them is the involvement of external actors and the respec-
tive degree of financial independence of the state of the project. Here,
our findings point to what can be called a paradox of emancipation.
The emancipation from a long‐standing dependence on interna-
tional donors, such as the WB, resulted in a loss of leverage for TANs
because transnational advocacy could not build on international (non‐
binding) norms, like the WB's environmental and social safeguard pol-
icies, and this indirectly favored the implementation of highly prob-
lematic infrastructure projects.
Another relevant finding concerns the power of frames such as
“green development,” by which the dam coalitions can support and
enforce their projects in line with national and global goals, suggesting
that the respective projects can solve the dilemma of economic
growth and environmental sustainability.
Our analysis also reveals a certain temporal and physical particular-
ity of dams and other large infrastructure projects: Once the huge
walls of a dam are built, once a river is deviated or a territory flooded,
“un‐building” these works is extremely costly and will not undo the
damage. From the perspective of the pro‐dam coalitions, the suspen-
sion or termination of such a project would result in massive sunk
costs and a loss of reputation. For the counter‐movements, in turn,
accepting the projects and negotiating better conditions and compen-
sations becomes a reasonable impact strategy in line with an ethics of
responsibility. The ensuing friction between different strands of the
movements leads to further limitations of their impact.
These preliminary findings would have to be complemented by
more empirical studies. In a context in which both authoritarianism
and the urgency of finding answers to climate change are on the rise,
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are most vulnerable to and least responsible for these developments
remain an important justice issue.REFERENCES
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